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COMMENTARY
In re Brett: The Sticky Problem of Statutory Construction
George Brett's pine tar almost let the plague of modern life, law-
yers, into the sole redeeming facet of modern life, baseball. *
Knowin' all about baseball is just about as profitable
as bein' a good whittler. **
INTRODUCTION
On July 24, 1983,1 at Yankee Stadium 2 in the Bronx,3 New York, 4
with two outs in the top of the ninth inning and one man on base,
Kansas City5 Royal Third Baseman George Brett6 hit a Goose Gos-
sage pitch into the seats in right field for an apparent home run. New
York Yankees manager Alfred M. Martin8 ran onto the field and
informed the home-plate umpire that the pine tar on Brett's bat
extended beyond the permissible eighteen-inch limit of the Official
Baseball Rules (Rules)." According to the Rules, Martin argued, the
batter should be called out for use of an illegal bat, and the home run
disallowed. The umpires conferred, measured the pine tar and upheld
Martin's protest. The game was over, the Yankees winning 4-3.10
The Royals filed a protest with Lee MacPhail, President of the
American League of Professional Baseball Clubs, contending that the
* Will, Such, Such Were the Joys, Newsweek, Jan. 2, 1984, at 72.
* * F. Hubbard, Saying, in J. Bartlett, Familiar Quotations 895 (14th ed. 1968).
1. July 24, 1983 occurred on a Sunday. 1983 Julian Calander 7 (Hallmark ed.).
2. The stadium, which opened in 1923, is affectionately known as the "House
that Ruth Built" for the hero of the 1920's, George Herman "Babe" Ruth. 2 D. Voigt,
American Baseball 157 (1970).
3. The borough is "[n]amed for Jonas Bronck, a Dane who settled the region in
1639." 4 Encyclopedia Americana 599 (1968 ed.).
4. "A city that never sleeps." Hear F. Ebb & J. Kander, Theme from New York,
New York (F. Sinatra ed. 1980) (Reprise Records no. RPS49233).
5. A city where "[e]v'rythin's up to date ...." R. Rogers & 0. Hammerstein
2nd, Oklahoma! 6 (1956).
6. Born May 15, 1953. Throws right, bats left. 1983 Topps Baseball Card no.
600.
7. Given name is Richard or "Rich," as is his financial status. Born July 5, 1951.
Throws right, bats infrequently. 1983 New York Yankees Yearbook 70, 76; 1983
Topps Baseball Card no. 240. Signed a contract with the San Diego Padres and now
may occasionally bat right.
8. Also known as Billy Martin. Born Alfred Manuel Pesano, on May 16, 1928.
The Baseball Encyclopedia 1171 (1969).
9. Off. Baseball R. 1.10(b), 6.06(a), (d) (Sporting News 1983); Am. League
Reg. 4.23 (Rules 1.10(b), and 6.06(d) were amended for the 1984 season, see infra
note 16).
10. N.Y. Times, July 25, 1983, at Al, col. 2. But see infra Conclusion.
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umpire's decision was not supported by the Rules. They maintained
that the home run should be reinstated and the game continued, the
Royals leading 5-4 with two outs in the top of the ninth inning."
MacPhail upheld the protest, 2 thus overruling a decision made on the
playing field for the first time in his ten-year tenure as League Presi-
dent. 13 In deciding the case, he looked beyond the text of the Rules
and relied instead upon the intent of the Rules' drafters, principles of
equity, and previous decisions involving pine tar.' 4 This Commentary
discusses whether the League President's decision was consistent with
generally accepted rules of statutory interpretation. '5 While this fac-
tual situation will never reoccur, due to a change in the rules,' 6 the
decision itself is of interest because it may affect the game far beyond
the facts1 7 of this particular controversy.' 8
11. Id. at C5, col. 3.
12. Decision Regarding the Protest of the Game of Sunday, July 24, 1983 Kansas
City at New York 1 (Press Release, American League, July 28, 1983) [hereinafter
cited as Brett Decision].
13. Boswell, Justice is Done with a Sticky Wicket, Wash. Post, July 29, 1983, at
C6, col. 1.
14. Brett Decision, supra note 12, at 1-2.
15. This Commentary, however, is not in response to Roy Cohn's fantasy that
"major sports be governed by rules of law, by rules and regulations with a common
sense basis .... Village Voice, Jan. 3, 1984, at 115, col. 6. Mr. Cohn represented
the Yankees in the pine tar controversy. Id. Rather, this Commentary is in response
to some feeling from within.
16. The Official Playing Rules Committee amended Rule 1.10 "so as to provide
only for the removal of a bat that is not properly treated in accordance with" the pine
tar provision. Minutes of the Official Playing Rules Committee, at 2 (Meeting of
Winter 1983-1984) (emphasis in original). New Rule 1.10 also contains a note specifi-
cally relating to the limit on the remedy for a pine tar infraction. Id. at 3. Further,
the definition of an illegally batted ball was deleted from Rule 2.00. Id. The first part
of the definition, relating to balls hit by batters with one or both feet outside of the
batters box, was incorporated in Rule 6.06(a), which previously referred to the entire
definition in Rule 2.00, id., and the portion referring to Rule 1.10 was omitted, id.
This Commentary does not address the merits of the new Rules; however, the
author does support the application of the Rules to future incidents involving excess
pine tar. This Commentary is limited to an examination of the League President's
decision as it relates to the Rules then in effect.
17. Facts lead to trivia, and baseball is filled with facts. For example, since the
inception of the Most Valuable Player Award, nine men have won the triple crown
(leading the league in batting average, home runs, and runs batted in). Four of these
winners did not win the Most Valuable Player Award. Can you name them? See infra
note 78 (answer).
18. To the extent Mr. MacPhail's decision reflects a reduced acceptance of the
sanctity of an umpire's ruling and the use of "clever ploys and gambits," baseball is
undermined. See infra pt. V.
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I. TEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF Ruims 1.10(b), 6.06(a) AND 6.06(d)
In every case involving statutory construction, 9 the relevant lan-
guage must initially be analyzed.20 Several rules and regulations are
applicable to the pine tar situation. 21 Specifically, Rules 1.10(b),22
6.06(a)23 and 6.06(d)24 of the Official Rules of Baseball and Regula-
tion 4.23 of the American League Regulations2 5 must be considered.
An examination of the rules reveals two possible theories for calling
a player out for use of excessive pine tar. The first involves a triad26 of
rules consisting of Rules 6.06(a), 2.00 and 1.10. Rule 6.06(a) states
that a player is out when "[h]e hits an illegally batted ball. '2 7 An
illegally batted ball is defined by Rule 2.00 as "one hit with a bat
which does not conform to Rule 1.10."28 Rule 1.10 provides in rele-
vant part that:
The bat handle, for not more than 18 inches from the end, may be
covered or treated with any material (including pine tar) to im-
prove the grip. Any such material, including pine tar, which ex-
tends past the 18 inch limitation, in the umpire's judgment, shall
cause the bat to be removed from the game. No such material shall
improve the reaction or distance factor of the bat.29
19. A threshold question which may be summarily resolved in the affirmative is
whether a baseball rule is a statute. Courts differ in their resolution of similar issues,
apparently in response to the nature of the rule involved and the action requested to
be taken in regard to it. Compare Fund for Constitutional Government v. National
Archives, 656 F.2d 856, 867 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (Federal Rule of Civil Procedure is
statute) with Founding Church of Scientology v. Bell, 603 F.2d 945, 951-52 (D.C.
Cir. 1979) (Federal Rule of Civil Procedure not a statute). Because of the nature of
the Rules at issue here, see infra notes 42-43 and accompanying text, a court of law
would certainly hold these rules to be a statute for the limited purpose of construing
them.
20. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 689 (1979); FTC v.
Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349, 350 (1941); Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323,
379 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
21. Nevertheless, many rules and regulations do not apply to the pine tar inci-
dent. See, e.g., Wolfe v. Shelley, 76 Eng. Rep. 206 (1579-1581) (Rule in Shelley's
Case); "Can You Top Joey Adams" Contest Official Rules, N.Y. Post, Dec. 23, 1983,
at 46, col. 6.
22. Off. Baseball R. 1.10(b) (Sporting News 1983) (amended 1984).
23. Id. R. 6.06(a) (amended 1984).
24. Id. R. 6.06(d).
25. Am. League Reg. 4.23.
26. As used in this Commentary, "triad" means a group of three. This should not
be confused with other meanings of the word triad such as a favorite form of gnomic
literature, a trivalent atom, a set of three vectors or a chord of three notes or tones.
See Webster's International Dictionary 2705 (2d ed. 1957).
27. Off. Baseball R. 6.06(a) (Sporting News 1983) (amended 1984,
28. Id. R. 2.00 (amended 1984).
29. Id. R. 1.10 (amended 1984).
[Vol. 52
IN RE BRETT
Together, these three rules imply that a batter should be called out
for use of excessive pine tar. Thus, as Mr. MacPhail stated, the um-
pire's decision was "technically defensible." '30
The second theory by which a player may be called out involves
applying Rule 6.06(d), which concerns the use of "doctored" bats.31 A
violation of this provision results in the batter being called out, ejected
from the game, and the imposition of "additional penalties as deter-
mined by the League President. ' 32 League Regulation 4.23, however,
specifically addresses the question of whether excessive pine tar consti-
tutes "doctoring" of a bat.33 The regulation states that the use of pine
tar in itself will not be considered to be "doctoring the bat. ' 34 The
regulation apparently takes a pine tar violation out of the coverage of
Rule 6.06(d), which penalizes players for using bats that are "doc-
tored." Application of Rule 6.06(a), however, would still result in the
batter being called out. This inconsistency in the rules should be
settled using various aids to construction.35 The first step should be to
use intrinsic evidence.
II. INTRINSIC RULE OF INTERPRErATION
A. Rule 6.06(d) and Regulation 4.23
Rule 6.06(d) and Regulation 4.23 present a common problem of
interpretation. The drafters of Regulation 4.23 excluded pine tar
infractions from only two of the three possible penalties for doctored
bats provided by Rule 6.06(d)-suspension and ejection from a
game.36 . By failing to exclude the third penalty of calling the batter
out, a question is raised whether the drafters intended to retain that
provision as a possible penalty for excessive pine tar use.
The rule of interpretation, expressio unius est exclusio alterius,
states that when specific examples are enumerated, those situations
not enumerated are not implied, especially when they are noted else-
where in the rules.3 7 Thus, by specifically removing two of the three
30. Brett Decision, supra note 12, at 1.
31. Off. Baseball R. 6.06(d) (Sporting News 1983). "Doctored" bats are those
"which have been altered or tampered with in such a way to improve the distance
factor or cause an unusual reaction on the baseball." Brett Decision, supra note 12, at
2 (emphasis omitted).
32. Id. The additional penalty is usually suspension of the player for a number of
games.
33. Am. League Reg. 4.23.
34. Id.
35. For other construction aids, see, but do not use 42 U.S.C. § 5305(a)(2) (Supp.
V 1981) (construction aid for public works including neighborhood facilities); see also
Cal. Civ. Code § 1793.2 (West Supp. 1983) (Lemon-Aid; defective car law).
36. Am. League Reg. 4.23.
37. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 188 (1978); E. Crawford, Construction of Stat-
utes § 195, at 334-37 (1940); see Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 512-13
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possible penalties that may be levied when a player uses a bat that is
"doctored" with pine tar, the Regulation apparently retains the rem-
edy of calling the player out for such an offense. This analysis seems to
indicate that Mr. Brett properly was called out, contrary to the
League President's decision. The analysis is not complete, however,
until the alternative method of analyzing the pine tar controversy is
similarly examined.
B. Rules 1.10(b), 2.00 and 6.06(a)
Application of Rules 1.10(b), 2.00 and 6.06(a) would apparently
result in the player being called out for the use of excessive pine tar. A
conflict among these rules, however, does exist. Although reading the
rules simultaneously implies that a batter should be called out when
he uses too much pine tar, Rule 1.10(b) merely seems to provide that
the illegal bat should be removed from the game. This conflict was
recognized by Mr. MacPhail who stated that "[i]f it was intended that
[a pine-tar] infraction should fall under the penalty of the batter's
being declared out, it does not seem logical that the rule should
specifically specify that the bat should be removed from the game. ' 38
The accepted maxim of construction is that the more specific rule
will apply when there is a conflict between two rules. 3 Assuming that
removal of the bat from the game and calling the player out are
considered conflicting remedies, Rule 1.10(b), which specifically pro-
vides that a bat with excessive pine tar should be removed from the
game, would be applicable in the instant situation. The two remedies,
however, may be read consistently as they may apply to different
factual situations. Removal of the bat is applicable if the batter has
not hit the ball. Calling the player out, on the other hand, is applica-
ble if he has. The two rules may therefore both be valid (Jespite the
inclusion of the specific remedy in Rule 1.10(b).
Reinforcing this result is the principle of construction which states
that rules should be read so as to give effect to all parts of the statute.40
If the remedy provided in Rule 1.10(b) is read as being an additional
(1981); Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpreta-
tion in the Supreme Court, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 892, 895 (1982) (Supreme Court revived
this maxim of construction) [hereinafter cited as Clear Statements]. But see Radin,
Statutory Interpretation, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 863, 873-74 (1930) (criticism of use of
maxim as "direct contradiction to the habits of speech of most persons").
38. Brett Decision, supra note 12, at 1.
39. Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398, 406 (1980); see Hill v. Morgan Power
Apparatus Corp., 259 F. Supp. 609, 611 (E.D. Ark.), aff'd, 368 F.2d 230 (8th Cir.
1966).
40. See Noble v. Marshall, 650 F.2d 1058, 1061 (9th Cir. 1981); Citizens to Save
Spencer County v. EPA, 600 F.2d 844, 870 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
434 [Vol. 52
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remedy for a pine tar violation rather than as being in conflict with
the remedy provided in Rules 6.06(a) and 2.00, all parts of the Rules
are given effect. Both theories, however, lead to the conclusion that
Mr. Brett should have been called out for the use of too much pine tar.
C. Rule of Lenity
An additional consideration which must be addressed when analyz-
ing both theories is the rule of lenity. The rule provides that penal
statutes are to be strictly construed against the government41-in this
case the umpires. Thus, any ambiguity in the rule must be decided in
favor of the alleged violator-in this case the batter. The baseball
rules, while not rules of law or equity,42 are akin to penal statutes. The
rules specify offenses and corresponding punishments. 43 Thus, al-
though the two theories may be harmonized in favor of calling the
batter out, the rule of lenity precludes the issue from being definitively
resolved. Extrinsic aids to interpretation therefore must be utilized to
resolve the conflict between the two sets of rules.
III. EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE
To determine the scope of a statute, courts examine legislative
history and other extrinsic evidence. This section applies such analysis
to the pine tar rule.44
A. Spirit versus Letter of the Law
Mr. MacPhail stated that the umpire's decision was within the letter
of the Rules, but "not in accord with the intent or spirit of the rules. '45
He noted that Rule 6.06(a), which refers to Rule 1.10, was intended to
relate only to "doctored bats." He added that bats with excess pine tar
should not be placed in this category. 46 Courts invoke such a rationale,
known as equitable interpretation, 47 to remove an act from the scope
41. See Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 278, 285 (1978); United
States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971); United States v. Patterson, 664 F.2d 1346,
1348 (9th Cir. 1982).
42. Aside, The Common Law Origins of the Infield Fly Rule, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1474, 1474 (1975).
43. See Taylor v. United States, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 197, 210 (1845); E. Crawford,
supra note 37, § 73, at 105 (1940).
44. See supra note 19.
45. Brett Decision, supra note 12, at 1.
46. Id. at 2. Judge Jacob Fuchsberg, recently retired from the New York Court of
Appeals, agreed with Mr. MacPhail's ruling. Judge Fuchsberg, however, only re-
ferred to Rule 1.10 and not Rule 6.06(a), and based his opinion solely upon the effect
of pine tar on hitting the ball. N.Y. Daily News, Aug. 2, 1983, at 29, col. 1.
47. See R. Dickerson, The Interpretation and Application of Statutes ch. 11, at
214 (1975); Clear Statements, supra note 37, at 896; cf. Berkow, The Eternal Pine-
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of a statute. 48 Equitable interpretation may be traced to the writings
of Hobbes, who49 stated that the "[i]ntention of the Legislator is
alwayes supposed to be Equity."'5 0 Aristotle referred to the doctrine as
"epieikeia."' S Under "epieikeia," a judge faced with a difficult case
should put himself in the place of the legislator and do what the
legislator would have done had he or she known of the present facts.
In other words, a judge is obliged to legislate equitably.52 Recently,
however, the Supreme Court has moved away from equitable inter-
pretation and from determining "what statutory words ought to
mean."' 53 Rather, the Court has established that the "law is what
literal words proclaim it to be."' 54 Thus, the League President's reli-
ance upon equitable interpretation is not consistent with present Su-
preme Court philosophy.
B. Legislative Purpose
A rule's purpose is often the touchstone of statutory construction. 55
"Purpose" is a broader concept than legislative intent. 5 A legislature's
"purpose" is the ultimate purpose that the legislature intends the
statute to accomplish or help to accomplish. Intent, on the other
hand, refers to the immediate goal of the statute.5 7 The legislative
history of the Rules, therefore, must be examined to determine legisla-
tive purpose and intent, thus aiding in the resolution of the conflict
between the two sets of Rules.
Tar Case, N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1983, at B9, col. 1 (Professor Halivni of the Jewish
Theological Seminary, when discussing the pine tar incident, was reminded of the
Talmudic lesson that it is anti-moral to use technical grounds to perpetrate chica-
nery.).
48. Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 469 (1975); see Bingler v. Johnson, 394
U.S. 741, 751-52 (1969).
49. Played first base. B. Abbott & L. Costello, Who's on First, on Hey Aaa-bott
(1978 ed.) (Murray Hill Records no. 899981).
50. T. Hobbes, Leviathan 326 (C.B. MacPherson ed. 1968).
51. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics bk. 5, ch. 10, at 141-42 & n.69 (M. Ostwald
trans. 1962); Marcin, Epieikeia; Equitable Lawmaking in the Construction of Stat-
utes, 10 Conn. L. Rev. 377, 382-84 (1978).
52. Marcin, supra note 51, at 393.
53. Clear Statements, supra note 37, at 896 (emphasis in original).
54. Id. An indication whether the Court will continue this trend may be dis-
cerned by examining the decision in Washington Post Co. v. United States Dep't of
State, 685 F.2d 698 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 65 (1983), which
involves the literal construction of a statute in apparent contravention of legislative
intent and Congress' power under the statement and account clause of the Constitu-
tion, U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
55. R. Dickerson, supra note 47, at 87.
56. Id. at 88.
57. Id.
436 [Vol. 52
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The legislative history of the Official Baseball Rules is not available
for public inspection. 8 The League President's statements and the
drafters' public statements regarding their intent, therefore, must be
scrutinized. According to Calvin Griffith, a member of the Playing
Rules Committee, "[g]uys were slopping that pine tar stuff all over
their bats. The balls were all getting discolored. The rule was put into
effect to keep the bats from discoloring the balls and having them
thrown out."59 In addition, the accumulation of pine tar was also
thought to allow a pitcher to cause the ball to behave erratically when
thrown, similar to the outlawed "spit-ball."
The circumstances surrounding the passage of the legislation may
also be examined to determine the intent of the drafters. 60 In response
to a player being called out for excessive use of pine tar,6 1 the rules
were amended to provide that "material, including pine tar, which
extends past the 18 inch limitation .. . shall cause the bat to be
removed from the game."62 Thus, despite the language of the rules,
the drafters apparently intended this to be the exclusive remedy for a
pine tar infraction.
Given these legislative purposes, the League President's decision
was correct. This conclusion, however, must be viewed in light of the
recent judicial trend towards relying upon the express language of a
statute rather than ascertaining legislative intent through the use of
extrinsic evidence.6 3 Under this philosophy of statutory construction,
the League President should not have considered the purpose of the
drafters. The true purpose of the rule, however, may thus be frus-
trated. Despite this trend toward literal interpretation, courts usually
examine the legislative history of a statute in order to reinforce their
decision. 4 Thus, Mr. MacPhail should not be faulted for attempting
to ascertain and follow the intent of the drafters. The correctness of
his decision nevertheless depends upon the school of interpretation in
vogue6 s at the time of the adjudication of the controversy.
58. For an irrelevant yet interesting discussion of unpublished opinions see Fen-
ner v. Dependable Trucking Co., 716 F.2d 605, 606 (9th Cir. 1983) (Chambers, J.,
dissenting) ("Someone here has the horse headed the wrong way between the shafts
of the buggy. His head is up against the single tree and the dashboard, and I do not
think the first memorandum should be 'depublicized.' ").
59. St. Louis Post Dispatch, July 26, 1983, at 30, col. 1.
60. See United States v. Curtis-Nevada Mines, Inc., 611 F.2d 1277, 1280 (9th
Cir. 1980).
61. Breit Decision, supra note 12, at 2.
62. Off. Baseball R. 1.10(b) (Sporting News 1983) (amended 1984).
63. See Clear Statements, supra note 37, at 894.
64. See Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Director, OWCP, 449 U.S. 268, 273-80
(1980); Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 823, 826 (1980). But see Mobil Oil
Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618 (1978) (no discussion of legislative history).
65. See, e.g., New Ground Rules-Shoes, Stockings and more, Vogue, July 1983,
at 184; Vogue Patterns: The All-Star Wardrobe, id. at 240.
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IV. PRECEDENT
In re Brett is not the first case involving excess pine tar to come
before Mr. MacPhail. At least two players have had hits nullified by
an umpire's pine tar call. In 1975, both Thurman Munson 6 of the
New York Yankees and Steve Stone67 of the Chicago Cubs were called
out for use of excessive pine tar.68 Neither of these incidents were
protested to the league office. A third incident in which the umpires
did not call the batter out is the only case in which a formal protest
forced the league to establish precedent. 69 In that case, the California
Angels protested a loss to the Kansas City Royals on the ground that
John Mayberry, 70 who hit two home runs in the game, had pine tar on
his bat beyond the 18 inch limit. The protest was denied. 7' Mr.
MacPhail ruled that a ball hit with a bat covered with excess pine tar
was not "an illegally batted ball under Rule 6.06(a). ' 72 Thus, Mr.
MacPhail's decision in Brett was consistent with the rationale in May-
berry.
V. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The pine tar decision may have a significant impact on the game of
baseball. By overturning the umpire's decision, Mr. MacPhail has
taken away a traditional managerial tactic-to use the rules to your
best advantage. "[C]lever ploys and gambits are a part of the essence
and history of baseball .. .- ,3 and tampering with this tradition
erodes part of the game's charm.
66. Position: catcher. Batted right, threw right. Batted .318 in 1975, despite
being called out for use of excessive pine tar. See 1976 Topps Baseball Card no. 650.
67. Position: pitcher. Bats right, throws right. 1976 Topps Baseball Card no.
378. Taking away a base hit from a pitcher is almost cruel and unusual punishment.
See U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
68. Boswell, supra note 13, at C6, col. 1.
69. Id.; St. Louis Post Dispatch, July 26, 1983, at 30, col. 1.
70. Position: first base. Bats left, throws left. Had 34 home runs in 1975, due in
part to the favorable ruling. 1976 Topps Baseball Card no. 440.
71. Boswell, supra note 13, at C6, col. 1; St. Louis Post Dispatch, July 26, 1983,
at 30, col. 1.
72. Brett Decision, supra note 12, at 2.
73. Berkow, supra note 47, at B9, col. 3; see B. Catton, The Great American
Game, in The Third Fireside Book of Baseball 90, 91 (C. Einstein ed. 1968) (Baseball
has "borrowed nothing from the 'sportsmanship' of more sedate countries ....
Anything goes; victory is what counts."). Contra St. Louis Post Dispatch, July 26,
1983, at 30, col. 3 ("Games are supposed to be decided by skills of players, not
technicalities and loopholes.").
Baseball is filled with such artful uses of the rules. Perhaps the most famous is the
case of Eddie Gaedel, a midget, being sent to bat for the St. Louis Browns. The act
was not favored by the league and the rules were changed to eliminate this possibility
from occurring again. See B. Veeck & E. Linn, Veeck-as in Wreck, in The Third
[Vol. 52
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Moreover, the impact of the pine tar decision may be felt far
beyond the immediate controversy. The sanctity of an umpire's ruling
is undermined. The pine tar ruling was the first instance during Mr.
McPhail's tenure as League President in which an umpire's decision
was overruled. 74 This reversal of a technically valid decision may
diminish the respect 7 afforded umpires' decisions in the future.16 It
may be argued that the power to overrule a decision made on the field
should be reserved for situations in which there is a clear abuse of
discretion by an umpire or when there is a clear error in applying the
rules. 77 Of course, there will be decisions by the umpires that the
Fireside Book of Baseball 479, 479-86 (1968). Perhaps the most consequential use of
the rules involved Fred Merkle of the New York Giants in 1908-it cost the Giants the
pennant. On September 23, 1908, the Giants were playing against the Chicago Cubs.
The score was tied 1-1 as the Giants batted in the bottom of the ninth inning. The
Giants put men on first and third with two outs. The next batter singled to center
field. The runner on third base crossed home plate with the apparent winning run.
The crowd poured onto the field. The runner on first base, Fred Merkle, however,
failed to touch second base, instead running for the clubhouse. The Cub's second
baseman noticed this and called for the ball. Following a number of mishaps includ-
ing the ball being thrown into the stands, a substitute ball was thrown to second
base. The umpire called Merkle out, and the run did not count. The league office
ruled that Merkle was out when he failed to touch second base. Thus, despite the
unfairness of the situation, the literal application of the rule was upheld, which
disallows any runs scored during a play resulting in the final out of an inning. See C.
Gregory, H. Kalven & R. Epstein, Cases and Materials on Torts 926-27 (3d ed.
1977); J. Rosenburg, The Story of Baseball 51-58 (1966). Other instances of artful
manipulation of the rules include the hidden ball trick, and decoying runners to set
up force outs on fly balls. Berkow, supra note 47, at B9, col. 3.
74. Boswell, supra note 13, at C6, col. 1.
75. For a deeper understanding of respect hear 0. Redding, Respect, on The
Soul Years-Atlantic Records 25th Anniversary (A. Franklin ed. 1967) (Atlantic Rec-
ord no. ST-A-732887 PR); R. Dangerfield passim.
76. N.Y. Post, July 29, 1983, at 88, col. 3 (Tim McClelland, home plate umpire
during the pine-tar game, stated that "[t]he rulebook is the only thing we have to go
by, and if someone wants to make a farce of the rules by saying they're not in the
spirit of the game, then we'll have to be men and take it."); id. at 82, col. 6 (Richie
Phillips, a former umpire and counsel for the Major League Umpires Ass'n stated that
the decision "is not going to sit well with our membership. They have a concern
about how much support they get from the league offices .... [T]his is not going to
help.").
77. An example of an umpire clearly misreading the rules occurred in a game
between the Boston Red Sox and the Chicago White Sox at Fenway Park on Septem-
ber 3, 1983. Chicago's Jerry Dybzinski came to the plate with none out and runners
on first and second. The count was no balls and two strikes when the next pitch hit
Dybzinski, who started toward first even though he bunted at the ball, only to be
called out by the first-base umpire. While he argued, the two base runners moved up
one base. When the "discussions" ebbed, both runners were allowed to remain on
second and third base. See Boston Globe, Sept. 4, 1983, at 44, col. 2. This is clearly
an incorrect result as Rule 6.08(b) states that "[w]hen the batter is touched by a
pitched ball which does not entitle him to first base, the ball is dead and no runner
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League President will consider to be within the letter of the rules, but
not the spirit. Instructing umpires to conform to the spirit of the rules
in the future can resolve these inconsistencies.
The umpires' decision in the pine tar controversy could be viewed as
a clear abuse of discretion, even though technically defensible, be-
cause it was contrary to previous decisions of the League President.
This argument, however, assumes that the umpires had a78 knowledge
of the appeals that had been ruled on by the league.79 An annotated
rule book containing the decisions in all appeals may solve this prob-
lem. Alternatively, the rules could clearly set out the league policy on
various issues and those rules that are in direct conflict with these
policies could be eliminated.
CONCLUSION
Kansas City Royals 5, New York Yankees 4.
Jared Tobin Finkelstein*
may advance." Off. Baseball R. 6.08(b) (Sporting News 1983). In this case, the
umpire involved freely admitted that he had made a mistake in allowing both
runners to move up a base. Boston Globe, Sept. 4, 1983, at 44, col. 2. This would be
an appropriate instance for the league president to overrule an umpire's decision.
78. "A" stands for answer to the trivia question, supra note 17. The four Triple
Crown winners who were not Most Valuable Players were Chuck Klein, Lou Gehrig,
and Ted Williams twice. D. Lally, A Bartender's Guide to Baseball 71, 221 (1981).
79. One commentator notes that the umpires should have known of the May-
berry protest and the two other 1975 pine tar incidents and were irresponsible for not
following the Mayberry ruling. See Sports Illustrated, Aug. 8, 1983, at 60.
* The author would like to express his appreciation to Stacey Lane and Stephanie
Vardavas for their assistance in the preparation of this Commentary.
